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The financial crisis in Southeast Asia has gained widespread attention.1 In
particular, the financial problems in Thailand since early February 1997 have
been a major focus of this attention. Even enthusiasts for the McKinnon-Shaw
arguments for financial liberalization (eliminating financial repression) to ac-
celerate economic development must be wary of liberalization and seek the
knowledge to limit financial crises, if, as critics say, liberalization contributes
to developing countries’ periodic costs on the order of 10%–20%, even 50%,
of gross domestic product (GDP) to recover from banking crises.
Briefly, the crisis occurred when banks and financial companies (financial
intermediaries) borrowed heavily on a short-term basis from banks in other
countries (mainly in Japan and the United States) and made overly risky loans
to finance the construction of commercial and residential units. When the
demand for such units was not forthcoming as expected, a domino effect
occurred: the real estate investors who borrowed defaulted, their lenders de-
faulted, and the banks were left with foreign-currency–denominated loans
requiring payment. A subsequent foreign exchange crisis followed the collapse
of the real estate market. That Thailand overbuilt commercial and residential
units is painfully obvious to any traveler to Bangkok. Some economists explain
the risky lending by banks and financial companies by resorting to the concept
of “moral hazard.”2 Had the demand for the real estate units been forthcoming
from Hong Kong and South China businessmen moving to Bangkok when
Beijing reasserted control over Hong Kong, as was expected, the financial
crisis may never have occurred.
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The macro data pertaining to the Asian financial crisis—trade statistics,
balance of payments accounts, and foreign direct investment flows—are abun-
dant. Anecdotal evidence at the micro level is also plentiful. What is scarce
in the literature on the topic is a microeconomic analysis of micro data,
specifically Asian business firm data. A recent paper by S. Reynolds, S.
Ratanakomut, and J. Gander examines the microeconomic data for major
industrial firms in Thailand and six other Southeast and East Asian countries.3
That paper dealt with the financial capital structure of firms, its relationship
to certain economic characteristics (firm size, profitability, and industry
sector), and the implied vulnerability of firms in the years preceding the crisis.
In a related paper, both micro and macro data were used with a logit approach
to estimate the probability of financial distress (firms closed down or reor-
ganized) for firms traded on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET).4
This article examines the financial capital structure of major financial
companies in Thailand over the period 1993–98. Our main focus is estimating
the probability of a financial company surviving to 1997 (the start of the
crisis) and the 1993–96 economic determinants of that probability. Both probit
and logistic binomial regression analyses are used. In addition, we were also
able to estimate the probability of a firm surviving to and operating in 1998.
This estimation requires the use of a multinomial ordinal logistic model. The
financial data set from balance sheets and income statements for some 91
financial companies is unique and, to our knowledge, has never been analyzed
in the way that we propose to do it.
We discuss the data and the methodology in Section II. The statistical
results are then presented in Section III. Some conclusions and limitations
are discussed in Section IV.
II. Data and Methodology
The financial data are from the balance sheets and income statements of 91
major financial companies (intermediaries) for each of the years in the treat-
ment period 1993–96. In 1997, only 35 of the original 91 companies survived
the financial crisis; of those 35 firms, only 23 survived to 1998. In all, 68
firms were shut down by the Thai government for various reasons relating to
risky lending practices. The data were obtained from the Bank of Thailand.
The statistical regressions use data for the period 1993–96, giving a total of
364 time-series and cross-section observations. Table 1 provides a comparative
statistical description of the variables used in the article for each subsample,
survivors and nonsurvivors. Based on the mean and range values in the table,
failed finance companies are not much different from the surviving companies.
Our methodology consists of postulating a relationship between the prob-
ability of a financial company surviving to 1997 (or surviving to 1998) and
certain key economic determinants (firm size in terms of assets, total assets
[TA], net profit, net income [NI], and borrowing and lending structures). A
time variable is also included to capture any trend effect. As both the borrowing
and lending structures are ratios, our model is a partial-financial-ratios model.
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TABLE 1
❈ ✁✂✄☎✄✆✝✞✟ ❉✟✠✡☎✝✂✆✝✞✟ ❙✆✄✆✝✠✆✝✡✠ ❢ ☎ 1993➊96 ✭Millions of Baht✮
Variable Definition Mean Minimum Maximum
Finance companies closed by 1997 (n ☛ 56) :
TA Total assets 13,892 418 102,411
INVCAP Total investment
capital 1,561 37 27,840
ATHCAP Authorized capital 291 .0☞ 5,559
NI Net income (profit) 157 ✌771 2,000
NPL Nonperforming loans 152. .0☞ 2,550
STD Short-term debt 11,783 279 76,657
LTD Long-term debt 730 8 11,753
STDPLTD Ratio of STD to LTD 34 3 148
BLD Business lending 9,763 32 66,410
BLPATHCP Ratio of BLD to
ATHCAP 2,107 .6 170,460
BLDPICAP Ratio of BLD to
INVCAP 8 .2 20
NPLPBLD Ratio of NPL to BLD .02 .0☞ .1
Finance companies surviving to 1997 ( :n
☛
35)
TA Total assets 16,333 279 77,378
INVCAP Total investment
capital 1,991 30 13,204
ATHCAP Authorized capital 481 .0☞ 4,900
NI Net income (profit) 331 ✌542 2,321
NPL Nonperforming loans 164 .0☞ 886
STD Short-term debt 13,061 134 63,297
LTD Long-term debt 1,232 7 13,070
STDPLTD Ratio of STD to LTD 38 1 151
BLD Business lending 11,800 58 59,728
BLPATHCP Ratio of BLD to
ATHCAP 3,851 4 196,204
BLDPICAP Ratio of BLD to
INVCAP 8 .4 22
NPLPBLD Ratio of NPL to BLD .03 .0☞ .6
Finance companies surviving to 1998 ( ):n ☛ 23
TA Total assets 16,437 279 77,377
INVCAP Total investment
capital 2,012 30 13,204
ATHCAP Authorized capital 489 .0☞ 4,900
NI Net income (profit) 338 ✌119 2,321
NPL Nonperforming loans 162 .0☞ 886
STD Short-term debt 13,071 134 63,297
LTD Long-term debt 1,387 7 13,070
STDPLTD Ratio of STD to LTD 39 1 151
BLD Business lending 12,092 58 59,728
BLPATHCP Ratio of BLD to
ATHCAP 4,128 4 196,204
BLDPICAP Ratio of BLD to
INVCAP 8 .4 22
NPLPBLD Ratio of NPL to BLD .02 .0☞ .6
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These ratios measure, in effect, the financial health of the firm. Our model
differs from the traditional methodology used in accounting and auditing
research in that the traditional approach is concerned with using financial
ratios to predict firm failure (or bankruptcy), per se, and not to predict the
probability of failure. The newer approach in accounting and auditing research
is concerned with the probability of failure. We will discuss this point later.
Since we use two probability models, we discuss the simpler binomial model
first.5
By knowing which of the 91 companies survived to 1997, we were able
to code the 91 companies existing in each year of the 1993–96 treatment period
as survivors (dummy variable coded 1) or nonsurvivors (coded 0). The derived
dependent (or response) variable was used in a probit and logistic(Y ✁ 0, 1)






Pr(I ✂ I) ✁ F(I),
unobservable threshold index, the unobservable and F(I) is eitherI ✁ a✄ bX,
the standardized cumulative normal distribution or its close approximation, the
logistic cumulative distribution function, Both functions1/[1✄ exp☎(a✄ bX)].
give the odds of survival (i.e., the probability of ).Y
✁
1
The central hypothesis is that, as firm size (assets) increases, the prob-
ability of survival decreases. The reasoning behind this hypothesis involves
the nature of financial intermediaries, the market of risky borrowers, and moral
hazard.
The nature of financial intermediaries is well known. As deposits (short-
term borrowing) grow, so do total assets. When lending is undertaken, only
the composition of assets changes. If the firm is practicing prudence in lending,
it confines its lending to low-risk borrowers (or investments). As assets grow
over time, the firm seeks more low-risk borrowers. The increase in firm size
should then not necessarily lower the probability of survival.
If, however, the market for low-risk borrowers dries up, the firm, in
seeking more highly risky borrowers, lowers its probability of survival. With
Thailand’s high propensity to save, finance companies generally have plenty
of liquidity. Moral hazard enters when finance companies aggressively seek
to increase their lending to more highly risky borrowers as their assets grow
and thereby decrease the probability of survival.
The reasoning behind the moral hazard argument is based on the belief
that financial companies had grown to expect to be bailed out by the gov-
ernment or central bank (Bank of Thailand) for any investment loans that
defaulted.6 There was, as it were, an implicit insurer of last resort. With such
financial backing coupled with the fact that financial companies have very
little of their own equity capital at risk, the moral hazard conjecture becomes
a worthwhile hypothesis to test.
The related hypotheses are that net profit is positively related to the
probability of survival; that the firm’s borrowing structure (given by the ratio
of short-term debt to long-term debt, STDPLTD) is inversely related to the
same probability; and that the lending structure (given by the ratio of business
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lending to total investment capital, BLDPICAP, and the ratio of nonperforming
loans to business lending, NPLPBLD) is inversely related to the probability
of survival.
Net profit produces internal growth in assets to the extent that profit is
retained by the firm. Among several financial uses, it provides a means to
pay off short-term borrowing, reduce the risk of default by the firm, and thus
increase the probability of survival.
Since the financial companies are intermediaries, their lending and bor-
rowing structures are expected to be important determinants of their probability
of surviving. They borrow (take deposits) from the public, banks, monetary
institutions, and other countries and lend to businesses and households while
setting aside a certain amount of their assets as reserves (as stipulated by law)
for bad loans. In general, a large firm with a high STDPLTD ratio, a low net
profit, a high NPLPBLD ratio, and a high BLDPICAP ratio is expected to
have a low probability of surviving to 1997.
For the multinomial ordinal model, we define a three-element dependent
(or response) variable.7 Financial firms that did not survive to 1997 are coded
firms that did survive to 1997 but not to 1998 are coded Y ✁ 1, andY✁ 0,
firms that survived to 1998 are coded Thus, there are three probabilities,Y✁ 2.
corresponding to the three mutually exclusive ordered responses,P , P , and P ,1 2 3
0, 1, and 2, for the given treatment period. A cumulative-probabil-
ity–proportional-odds model is used for a logistic function. It is of the form
log and log where the odds(P /1✂ P )✁ a   bX [(P   P )/P ]✁ a   bX,1 1 1 1 2 3 2
ratios are proportional and thus have common slopes given by the coefficient
vector, b. The X-determinants give the probability (or the odds) of not surviving
to 1997 and the probability (or the odds) of either not surviving to 1997 or to
1998. The probability of surviving to 1998 (i.e., the 23 firms) is given by P3.
Naturally, the cumulative probability (or the odds) of all three events is one.
Note that, for this model, we use Y in its natural order (0, 1, 2).
The methodology of using known survivors in 1997 and 1998 after the
fact as a way to identify and separate the less risky firms from the more risky
firms in the earlier period (1993–96) is similar to the methodology used in
revealed preference theory to analyze consumer and firm behavior and to the
methodology traditionally used in accounting and auditing research.8 The
current methodology is superior to the traditional methodology of relying
solely on financial ratios and discriminant analysis to predict firm failure in
that we predict the probability of failure based on ratios and absolute variables.9
In our approach, we address the dynamics of the failure process by identifying
the firms that failed in 1997 and those that later failed in 1998.10 Also, by
observing which firms do in fact survive, there is a presumption that some
kind of market optimizing process is working. This process selects for survival,
if you will, those financial companies that have been practicing prudence in
lending and borrowing and have not been guilty of “moral hazard.” In this
somewhat indirect way, we attempt to test the conjecture of Krugman and
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others. What we do by examining the economic determinants of the probability
of survival is identify what it takes to be a well-managed financial company
(or, conversely, an ill-managed company).
The current methodology has limitations. As indicated, our testing of the
“moral hazard” conjecture is indirect. In light of alternatives, this limitation
seems reasonable. A direct test would involve a case study of each financial
company. Other limitations pertain to using two of the independent variables
as ratios.11 Specifically, both the borrowing and lending structures are ratios.
As such, their behavior could be caused by recording errors in either the
numerators or the denominators. Also, the lending structure combines business
and household loans relative to invested capital, when, ideally, the numerator
should be separated. The data, however, would not permit separation. In effect,
we assume the same degree of risk for both types of loans.
Total invested capital, that part of the company’s assets that is set aside
as a reserve, has two main components: investments in government institutions
(such as, in the United States, investing in government bonds) and authorized
capital investment. The latter is a minimum reserve against risky assets (loans)
and is set by law. We are able to separate investment capital into its two
components and use as authorized capital (ATHCAP) as an alternative to total
invested capital. The lending structure then has the ratio of BLD/ATHCAP✁
BLPATHCAP.
Last, we have no way of verifying the validity of the financial data by
cross-checking it with other sources of data. Our best judgment, based on the
numbers themselves and their behavior, is that the data are valid.
III. Statistical Results
The probit and logistical regression results are given in table 2. Two different
runs for each of the three models of the probit and logistic regressions were
made. Both runs use the lending and borrowing structures, but, in the case
of the lending structure, one run uses the ratio of business lending to total
investment capital (BLDPICAP) and the other uses business lending to au-
thorized capital (set by law). Regardless of which denominator was used, the
variable was not statistically significant, so only the model with total invest-
ment capital is reported.
For models 1 and 2, the probit and logistic regressions all have coeffi-
cients that are highly significant, with the exception of the coefficient for
BLDPICAP. There is no heterogeneity problem. The DFBETAS test on the
regression coefficients indicated one influential outlier, observation number
357 for the NPLPBLD (nonperforming loans per business loans) coefficient.
In theory, this variable is an important indicator of financial problems. Runs
without this observation did not change much. The value of the NPLPBLD
coefficient for both models was reduced, but it remained not significant. The
corresponding exp value was smaller. As the other results were virtually(B)
the same, the results in the table are for the full sample. Because the results
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TABLE 2
❈ ✁✂✄☎✄✆✝✞✟ ❘✝✠✡☛❘✟✠✂ ☞✠✟ ▼ ✌✟✍✠✎ ❚✏✄✝✍✄☞✌ ❋✝☞✄☞✑✝✄✍ ❈ ✁✂✄☞✝✟✠✒ 1993➊96
Variable
Model 1 (1, 0)
PROBIT
Model 2 (1, 0)
LOGISTIC
Model 3 (0, 1, 2)
CUM LOGISTIC
Constant ✓20.5 ✓34.0 20.1 20.8
(✓2.90)* [8.31]* ✔✔[3.51] [3.75]
TA ✓.0004 ✓.00006 .00004
(✓3.64)* [12.37]* [5.71]*
STDPLTD .0083 .0143 ✓.0143
(2.80)* [7.90]* [9.44]*
NI .0024 .0041 ✓.0026
(5.19)* [24.13]* [16.43]*
BLDPICAP ✓.0111 ✓.0179 .0149
(✓.57) [.31] [.24]
NPLPBLD 6.96 11.62 ✓5.52
(2.63)* [6.59]* [3.83]✔
YEAR .21 .35 ✓.20
(2.80)* [7.73]* [3.11]
✕
2 362.7 363.7 41.17
p ✖ .406 p ✖ .406 p ✖ .0001
Cannot reject Cannot reject Reject null B ✖ 0
Classification rate,
overall (%) 68.4 67.9 67.6
◆
 ✆✟
✗✘The ratio of coefficient to standard error is given in parentheses. The Wald ✕2 is
given in brackets. The cumulative logistic model, model 3, generates two intercept values.
✔ p ✙ .10.
* p ✙ .05.
for both regression models are equivalent, our discussion will focus on the
logistic regression.
Firm size (measured in total assets) is inversely related to the probability
of survival (or odds of survival), indicating that large companies have less
of a chance of surviving to 1997 than relatively smaller companies. It is
interesting that others have found the same result for American nonfinancial
firms during the period 1970–83.12 This “large-firm disease” is consistent with
the “moral hazard” argument and the reasoning underlying it. The coefficient
for the borrowing structure is positive, indicating that the more highly risky
borrowing structure has a higher probability of surviving to 1997. This is the
opposite of our expectation. The profitability coefficient has the expected
positive sign.
The time-variable coefficient is positive, indicating that, as time goes on,
the probability of survival increases. This is a surprise. It may be because of
the implicit bias in the “survival of the fittest” approach to identifying the
more risky firms. Positively, it could indicate that the less risky firms became
more healthy financially over time and that is why they were selected (by the
market, in effect) to survive. The nonperforming loans index (NPLPBLD)
has a positive coefficient, which is also the opposite of our hypothesis.
Model 3 is for the cumulative probability logistic regression. The pro-
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portional-odds hypothesis could not be rejected, and the global null hypothesis
was rejected for all the regression coefficients. The intercepts for both logit
functions are marginally significant ( and .0529, respectively), asp✁ .0611
is the coefficient for NPLPBLD ( ). The coefficients for the timep
✁
.0504
variable (YEAR) and lending structure (BLDPICAP) are not significant.
Again, as firm size increases, the probability (or the odds) of not surviving
to 1997 or to 1998 increases, the large-firm disease. Also, as before, as the
borrowing structure becomes more risky (the short-term to long-term debt
ratio increases), the probability of not surviving to 1997 and 1998 falls, a
result opposite to our expectation. The profit coefficient is negative, as ex-
pected, indicating that the probability of not surviving falls as the profitability
increases.
All three models are very good predictors of firm failure and survival.
The overall classification accuracy averages 68%. As an example, the logistic
model 2 predicts 51 firms that would fail by 1997 (56 did fail) and 11 firms
that would survive (35 did survive). There are 29 misclassifications. All in
all, the models greatly underpredict the number of survivors. A year-to-year
analysis has the models consistently predicting 49–51 firms failing by 1997,
an 89% prediction rate. The results indicate that, as early as 1993, financial
conditions were not all good in Thailand and that they remained so until 1997,
when 56 finance companies were shut down.
IV. Some Conclusions
On balance, our indirect test of the conjecture of Krugman and others would
seem to indicate some support for it. Small firms appear more likely to survive,
perhaps because they have relatively more to lose financially and are less
connected politically, and thus they are more cautious about lending. Con-
cerning political connectivity, however, we find from informal inquiries that
all the financial companies have some political connection with institutions
from which they borrow. Companies with relatively more short-term debt (the
deposits of customers and other borrowing) and more nonperforming loans,
however, appear more likely to survive and, by implication, are more cautious
about their lending practices. These results are not consistent with the moral
hazard conjecture.
It appears, then, that the large financial companies with relatively less
(not more) short-term debt and nonperforming loans are more apt to practice
“moral hazard.” This is a curious mixture of characteristics that is not easily
explained. One would think that large financial companies with relatively
large short-term debt and nonperforming loans would have a smaller prob-
ability of survival (or higher odds of not surviving) and would be more apt
to practice “moral hazard.” Overall, therefore, the firm-size results or the
“large-firm disease” is consistent with the moral hazard conjecture, but the
borrowing and lending structures do not lend support to the conjecture. Nev-
ertheless, further research on testing the conjecture is indicated. In terms of
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public policy implications, our results suggest that smaller rather than larger
financial intermediaries should be encouraged.
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